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SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS AND PRIZES
By M. S.

HUBERMAN

Assistant Professorof Law, Hastings College of Law

In the good old days when rates were low and exemptions high it was
the rare scholar whose efforts were so well compensated as to require the
payment of a substantial income tax. But it is the rare scholar who does not
now have his income tax problems. And since a scholar's income does not
usually make him familiar with the top tax brackets, he may be startled at
the huge bite taken by the income tax should that perhaps unexpected but
quite welcome award or prize turn out to be taxable income.
The issue is the extremely troublesome one of drawing the line between
compensation, on the one hand, and gifts in the income tax sense, on the
other. The Internal Revenue Code1 defines gross income as including "gains,
profits and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for
personal services . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid . . .
and income derived from any source whatever." But the code excludes from
gross income "the value of property acquired by gift."' The term "gift"
is here used in a narrower sense than its common law meaning, so that
wholly voluntary payments made without legal or moral obligation are not
gifts for income tax if made as compensation for services rendered, however
much they may qualify as gifts at the common law.' It is not true, therefore,
that all gifts are exempted from income tax. To be excluded from income,
the gift must not be compensation.
In an early ruling4 the General Counsel of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue held that an award made in recognition of an individual's achievements in science and his services in promoting the public welfare was not
taxable income. The award was made by a Foundation created to receive
and use an endowment fund for awarding prizes, granting scholarships
and engaging in research as a means of promoting the general welfare, the
advancement of liberal thought and the furtherance of international peace.
In concluding that the award was a gift, the ruling stated:
"An award of this kind made by one to whom no services have been

'Section 22(a). The code uses the term "gross income" to define the items which must be
reported as income. The subtraction from gross income of the deductions allowed by the code
produces "net" income which (after allowing for the credits) becomes the amount upon which the
tax rates are applied. "Gross" income is therefore synonymous with taxable income.
'Section 22(b) (3).
3
For example, Fisher v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 192 (2d Cir., 1932).
'C.C.M. 5881, Cum. Bull. VIII-1, pp. 68-69 (1929).

(116)

SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS AND PRIZES

117

rendered is a gratuity as distinguished from compensation for services.
Clearly the award was not a competitive prize."5

The ruling excludes from taxable income such awards as the Nobel
prize as distinguished from a "competitive prize." In a broad sense there is
competition for Nobel and other awards made in recognition of outstanding
contributions in intellectual endeavor, but the bureau is here distinguishing
between such recognition awards and a prize given in a contest, as a prize
for the best novel, musical composition, architectural design or the like
submitted to a board of judges. The bureau views awards of this kind as
compensation for services, and is advancing this contention with increasing

success in the courts.
There appears to be no disposition as yet by the bureau to tax recognition awards, not involving any contest, but it is a question whether this
attitude will prevail if the bureau should achieve full victory in the contest

cases. In these days of high tax rates and even higher revenue needs and
in the face of a congressional reluctance to close the gap by increased taxes,
the bureau is forced to tap all available sources of taxable income. The
award enriches the recipient to the same extent whether or not it is made
in a contest. Although the Court of Appeals thought otherwise in the
McDermott' case, the concept of taxable income does not require an element
of annual recurrence, as witness the tax imposed on sweepstakes winners,
successful contestants on radio programs,' and capital gains. Is there any
'The requirement that services must be rendered to the payor in order to tax the payment as
compensation seems clearly unsound. If A is paid by B to perform services for C, A receives
compensation. If there is a gift present, it is a gift by B to C. Also since compensation under
the code includes additional payments (such as a bonus or pension) made without legal or other
obligation for services already rendered and compensated, it should make no difference that the
bonus or pension is paid by some one other than the recipient of the services. The only ground
for holding such a payment to be a gift is that it was made without thought of compensating
for services. This was the view of the four dissenting Justices in Bogardus v. Commissioner,
302 U.S. 34 (1937). That case held that bonuses paid to employees by the former stockholders
of a company were exempt gifts. It has been stated that "the position taken by the minority in
the Bogardus case . . . is more apt to represent the law at the present time in view of the
present membership of the United States Supreme Court." Mertens, LAw OF FEDERAL INcomE
TAxATioN (2d ed., 1942), vol. 1, § 8.08, footnote 80. The majority opinion, however, still carries
weight. Newton v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 512 (1948) (A). And the Regulations contain the
language that "so-called pensions awarded by one to whom no services have been rendered are
mere gifts or gratuities and are not taxable." Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-2. This language was also
used in LO. 1040, 3 C.B. 120 (1920), in which the Solicitor of Internal Revenue held (reversing
an earlier ruling) that pensions awarded by the Carnegie Foundation to retiring teachers or,
after their death, to their widows were not taxable as compensation. Is there any sound reason
why these pensions should be treated more favorably under the income tax laws than other
pensions?
'MfcDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (U.S.C.A. D.C., 1945).
"Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937) ; Silver v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 461 (1940);
LT. 3987, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 9. But see Washburn v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945), in
which a winner on the Pot O'Gold program was held to have received a gift. The decision is
based on the fact that the winner did nothing at all to receive the award. It seems clear that this
decision would not be followed where there was anything at all constituting participation by the
winner in the radio program.
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reason why a Nobel prize winner should receive more favorable tax treatment
than the novelist who labors all his life and finally produces a successful
novel? Once it is conceded that the common-law concept of gifts does not
govern, it is certainly at least arguable that any payment made on the basis
of work done by the recipient in the course of his professional career is
taxable as compensation for services rendered.
The bureau has recently stated that if "a grant or fellowship is made
for the training and education of an individual, either as part of his program
in acquiring a degree or in otherwise furthering his educational development, no services being rendered as consideration therefor, the amount of
the grant is a gift which is excludible from gross income."' Thus, the usual
scholarship or fellowship to a college or university student is not taxed.
This ruling may indicate the unsoundness of the distinction between recognition awards and competitive prizes. Every student who has had to win a
scholarship in order to stay in college will testify that a scholarship is a
competitive prize. Yet it is clear that such awards are not compensation
for services. They are made merely to enable the student to complete his
education. The donor to this extent is acting as the foster parent of the
student. It should, therefore, make no difference whether the award is to
a person seeking an A.B., LL.B, M.D., Ph.D. or any other (or no) degree.
Furthermore, it should make no difference whether the award is made by
a charitable organization or by a commercial enterprise. In all these
instances the element of compensation for services is lacking.
The grant of a scholarship or fellowship may be conditioned on the
rendering of services, such as part time teaching or tutoring or the grading
of examinations. To that extent there is an element of compensation present.
Although an award may be primarily a scholarship and only to a minor
extent compensation for services, the bureau may take the position that the
burden is on the recipient to demonstrate what portion of the award is
scholarship. Perhaps the only safe procedure in such situations is for the
donor to specify how much is scholarship and how much compensation.
In addition to scholarships and fellowships there are many prizes
available to university students upon the basis of a specific contest, such as
the submission of the best piece of creative writing or research. Is it likely
that the bureau will seek to tax these prizes, using the contest cases as
precedents? Here, again, the distinction between recognition awards and
competitive prizes breaks down. Grants to students on the basis of specific
contests are, equally with scholarships, made in furtherance of their educational development. Perhaps the simple approach is that the student has not
reached the stage of income producing activity in his educational work but
'I.T. 4056, Cum. Bull. 1951-17-13643.
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is merely acquiring the training necessary to produce income. It is farfetched to regard awards of any kind to a student on the basis of work done
by him in his courses or in any of the other intellectual activities offered
by the university as being compensation for that work.
When, however, the student has completed his university training and
presumably is ready to put his acquired skill to work, the bureau takes the
position that the fellowships he receives are taxable income. The bureau's
recent ruling on fellowships9 considered four "representative" awards made
by a foundation. Two of the awards were to university professors who
were undertaking specific scientific research. One was to enable a professional writer to finish a novel. The fourth was to finance research in Europe
by the holder of A.B. and Ph.D. degrees into the relations between government and economic processes. The foundation received no rights in any of
the work produced by the recipients, did not require them to submit progress
reports, nor were the awards contingent upon the completion of the projects.
The bureau ruled that all four stipends were taxable as compensation for
personal services. The bureau reasoned that the fellowships were "not for
the training or education of the recipients" but were granted in consideration
of the application by the recipients of their respective skills and training
"with the expectation of results consistent with the recipients' qualifications,"
and that "to the extent there is any donative intent present . . . the bene-

ficiary is society at large and not the recipient of the award whose services
are expected in return for the grant."
This distinction between a grant to enable an individual to complete
his education and one to secure the employment of an individual's skill and
training is one of substance. To be sure, an undergraduate studying on a
scholarship is employing skills and training already acquired and, on the
other hand, a professional scholar or writer is necessarily furthering his
educational development by the employment of his skills and training.
Nevertheless, in the former case it is clear that the grant is made for the
purpose of furthering education, whereas in the latter case the primary
purpose of the grant is to put the individual's skill to work to achieve
concrete objectives. The distinction is valid even though in both situations
the donor relies upon the honor of the individual to carry out the objectives
of the grant. The loose arrangements between foundations and recipients
of awards is presumably in recognition of the fact that the special skills
sought to be employed flourish best in an atmosphere of freedom. There
are doubtless many similar arrangements by industrial corporations for the
employment of inventive or other creative talent. When the individual has
finished his schooling and seeks to employ his acquired skills for economic
'See footnote 8 supra.
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gain it does not seem fair to other taxpayers to grant him an exemption
upon some supposed ground that his skills contribute more directly to
human betterment than do the daily activities of the masses of the population
whose combined efforts produce the economic wealth of the nation. Nor
is such a favored treatment justifiable on any notion that the recipient is
merely furthering his own education. So does the lawyer or doctor further
his education by the daily practice of his profession. If school days are
over and the scholar has offered his skills for monetary gain there is no
reason why he should not bear his fair share of the cost of civilized government along with everybody else.
The bureau may, therefore, meet with considerable success in its effort
to tax fellowship awards by foundations.'" There will be cases in which
the line suggested by the bureau's ruling may be difficult to draw. Thus,
a graduate student may be required to produce an original piece of work
in order to qualify for a Ph.D. degree. Under such circumstances is a fellowship granted to that student compensation for the employment of skills or
assistance in furtherance of an education? It would seem that this situation
falls in the latter category. The grant is essentially to enable the individual
to develop special skills and training in much the same way as a scholarship
to a law or medical student is to aid him in qualifying for his chosen profession. Similarly, a fellowship to a graduate in law working for his doctor's
degree would seem to fall on the side of furtherance of an education.
There are now five court decisions involving competitive prizes for
essays and the like." The commissioner was successful in the three cases
coming before the Tax Court,12 but one of these decisions was reversed on
appeal.'" The other two cases were suits for refund in district courts,' 4
and in both the taxpayer was successful, but one of these cases has been
reversed and is now pending in the United States Supreme Court.'
In the McDermott case' 6 the United States Court of Appeals, District
of Columbia, reversing the Tax Court, held that the Ross essay prize awarded
annually by the American Bar Association was an excludible gift. The
l"In Straus v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. 830 (1947), a doctor of established reputation in the
field of neurology and psychiatry had been devoting so much of his time to the work of a hospital
for the mentally ill that his practice had suffered materially. A group of his friends decided to
give him $10,000 but in order to obtain a deduction for a charitable contribution, they employed
the procedure of paying the money to a charitable foundation, which thereupon made a grant of
$10,000 to the doctor, stating that "this grant . . . is intended to enable you to give your maximum
attention for the next two years to the development of the Hillside Hospital." The court sustained
the commissioner's determination that the $10,000 was taxable as compensation.
"McDermott v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 585 (U.S.C.A. D.C., 1945) ; Stein v. Commissioner,
14 T.C. 494 (1950) ; Waugh v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. 309 (1950) ; Amirikian v. United States,
100 F.Supp. 263 (D.C. Md., 1951); and Robertson v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 660 (D.C. Utah,
1950) reversed 190 F.2d 680 (10th Cir., 1951), certiorari granted December 11, 1951.
"The McDermott, Stein and Waugh cases, supra footnote 11.
"The McDermott case.
"The Amirikian and Robertson cases, supra footnote 11.
"The Robertson case, suprafootnote 11.
"Supra, footnote 11.
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Chief Justice dissented. The majority of the court reasoned that the American Bar Association was not buying the services of the winning contestant
nor did the latter regard himself as exchanging his services for money.
The court distinguished this competition from contests operated for commercial purposes and concluded that "requiring winners of scholarly awards
to pay taxes on them would conflict with the wise and settled policy of
encouraging scholarly work." In 1949 the bureau announced that it would
not follow this decision." The reasoning of the court appears broad enough
to include in the category of gifts all types of grants by charitable foundations for research or other creative work.
In two cases decided by the Tax Court in 1950 the court distinguished
the McDermott case on its facts. In Stein v. Commissioner" the Tax Court
held that a prize paid by the Pabst Brewing Company for the best plan
for post-war employment was taxable as compensation. The same result
was reached in Waugh v. Commissioner9 involving a prize for an essay on
farm price policies in a contest held by the American Farm Economic
Association, a tax-exempt organization. In both cases the Tax Court viewed
the McDermott decision by the Court of Appeals as based upon a finding
by that court of donative intent on the part of the American Bar Association,
although the Tax Court made it clear that it did not agree with such a finding
nor with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. The Tax Court held that
the Pabst Brewing Company did not intend a gift since it treated the expenditures in the contest as a business expense, as part of its advertising program,
and that the American Farm Economic Association's motive was not purely
donative since it did derive benefit from the contest by stimulating interest
in itself and in American farm economics. The Tax Court, however, plainly
expressed its view that the intent of the donor is not the controlling factor,
stating "that in the McDermott case . . . too much importance was placed
on the question whether the original furnisher of the money intended to
make a gift and too little attention was paid to the question whether there
was as to the recipient
gain or compensation from labor or work at a business
20
or profession."
In Amirikian v. United States2' the District Court held that an award
for an engineering paper on arc welding in a contest conducted by a taxexempt foundation created to stimulate scientific research was a gift. The
court expressed the view that an award within the objectives of a philanthropic organization must be regarded as donative. The reversal of the Robertson2 2 case by the Circuit Court of Appeals is
-7LT. 3960, 1949-2 Cum. Bull. 13.
"See footnote 11 supr.
"See footnote 11 supra.

-014 T.C. 494,501.
"See footnote 11 supra.
"See footnote 11 supra.
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the most important victory achieved to date in the campaign to tax all competitive prizes. In that case a composer submitted a symphony written years
before without thought of profit or sale as his entry in a contest2 3 for the best
symphonic composition written 'by native born composers of the Western
Hemisphere. The prize money was supplied by an individual who was the
president of a non-profit organization which apparently sponsored the Detroit
Symphony Orchestra. The court held, reversing the District Court, that the
award was taxable income.2 4 Starting from the familiar premises that the
broad definition of gross income in section 22(a) of the code shows a
congressional purpose to exercise the full measure of the constitutional power
and that the exemption for gifts should therefore be strictly construed, the
court interpreted prior decisions as applying "the practical test" of determining whether the "income was received gratuitously and in exchange for
nothing." Even though the composition was originally written without
thought of profit, it was nevertheless the product of the composer's professional skill and training, and in submitting that product in a contest he
was seeking financial gain for his labors "just as much as though he had sold
it or had been paid for its use." The court, therefore, concluded that it
cannot be said that the prize was "entirely gratuitous and received in
exchange for nothing."
It is to be hoped that the United States Supreme Court in reviewing
the Robertson case will take this opportunity to shed some much needed
light on the gift versus compensation issue. The average taxpayer who is
finding it difficult to meet his living expenses out of what is left in his pay
check after deducting the withholding tax may not easily understand why
a gift recipient who contributes no labor may nevertheless spend the whole
amount of the gift. It is difficult to convince him that the exemption for
gifts does not do violence to the principle of taxation in accordance with
ability to pay. While the favored treatment for gifts exists, it is understandable, however, that those who do labor for their "gifts" should regard themselves as much entitled to the exemptions as the wholly gratuitous donee.
But two wrongs do not make a right. There is no reason why an individual
who receives monetary reward for his labors should be any the less taxed
because the reward is in the form of a grant or prize rather than a fee or
salary or wage.
"The facts of this case illustrate that the distinction between a recognition award and a
competitive prize may be very tenuous. Thus, is an award by a non-profit organization for the
best play written in 1951, where no entries are submitted but selection is made among the plays
published during that year to be distinguished from an award made on the basis of the submission
of unpublished plays to a board of judges? Is not the gain from work at a profession the same
in both cases?
"Under the terms of the contest the composers of winning compositions were required to
relinquish certain rights to the non-profit organization. The Circuit Court of Appeals expressly
refrained from basing its decision on the narrow ground that the relinquishment of such rights
was a consideration sufficient to prevent the award from being a gift.

